Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won Brazil’s presidential runoff on October 25, 2026. The margin was thin. BBC News Brasil reported 51.79% of valid votes for Lula and 48.21% for Senator Flávio Bolsonaro. The vote decided who would serve as president of Brazil for the next four years.
Three weeks earlier, Lula was losing. Al Jazeera reported that Flávio Bolsonaro finished the first round on about 47% of valid votes. Lula took 44.9%.
Disclaimer: This article does not promote Lula or his policies. In this article, I will analyze how the marketing strategies that have helped him win the elections. I will cover the tactics his team used in the runoff and the message-building that started more than a year earlier.
Your trust matters, which is why I’ve attached credible news sources to every marketing strategy discussed, making fact-checking effortless.
From First-Round Setback to Making History in Second Rounds: Lula’s Unbelievable Comeback
The campaign entered October with a math problem. Congresso em Foco columnist Antônio Augusto de Queiroz counted 56.1 million first-round votes for Flávio Bolsonaro and 53.9 million for Lula. That is a gap of 2.2 million votes. Another 33.5 million registered voters stayed home.
The result surprised Lula’s own side. Al Jazeera reported that most polls had him finishing first and that Lula himself called the outcome “unexpected.” Allies had also complained about the campaign’s online performance, Diário Carioca reported.
Comebacks from second place are rare in presidential Brazil. TIME reported that Lula became the first candidate since 1985 to finish second in the first round and still win.
Where 2.2 Million Votes Could Come From
So, the math is simple after the first round. To become the president brasilien, Lula will need more than 2.2 million votes than his opponents.
There were two pools. One was Flávio’s own electorate. The other was the 33.5 million people who did not vote. Lula’s campaign focused more to bring the voters on the polling booth who did not vote.
Mobilization: Chasing the Voters Who Stayed Home
In marketing terms, we can say “The campaign went after lapsed customers before cold prospects.” As a result, turnout moved more than the polls expected!
The Turnout Target
BBC News Brasil reported that abstention fell from 21.08% in the first round to 19.22% in the runoff. That is a drop of 1.86 percentage points. In 2022, the same report said, the drop between rounds was about 0.4 points.
Lula named one audience out loud. Older voters. Voting is optional for Brazilians over 70, and he told supporters that many in that group “didn’t vote because the law doesn’t require them to,” according to the BBC. At a São Paulo rally, Agência Pública quoted him saying the campaign had to talk to “people who think they no longer have the right to vote.”
The vote totals show the scale. Using de Queiroz’s figures, Lula went from 53.9 million votes to 64.3 million between rounds, a gain of 10.4 million. Flávio went from 56.1 million to 59.8 million, a gain of 3.7 million. Abstentions fell from 33.5 million to 30.5 million.
Networks and Streets
Online activity was tied to physical events. Agência Pública reported that the first runoff rally took place in Ceilândia, near Brasília, on October 9. Two days later, a rally on São Paulo’s Avenida Paulista filled seven city blocks. Organizers claimed one million people. That figure was not independently confirmed.
Smaller events ran in parallel. One, at the Federal University of Amapá, set an explicit goal of reaching the 21.08% of voters who had abstained, the same outlet reported.
Analysts quoted by the BBC described the pattern in almost identical terms. Denilde Holzhacker of ESPM said online “missions” connected “the logic of the networks with large mobilizations.” Mayra Goulart of UFRJ put it more simply. “It was a combination of networks and streets.”
The Election-Day Operation
Mobilization did not stop at the rally. On runoff day, Lula’s coalition filed an action with the Superior Electoral Court over bus shortages in at least nine states, Agência Brasil reported. It asked for voting to be extended to 7 p.m. in affected areas and for arrests of anyone obstructing voters.
In Salvador, the state consumer agency Procon-BA found 370 buses parked in garages, according to the same report. The Bahia regional electoral court requested the arrest of a local mobility secretary. The report did not include a final ruling on the campaign’s request to extend voting.
From a marketing view, this is last-mile conversion. A supporter persuaded online is worth nothing if the bus never comes. The accusations of deliberate interference were the campaign’s, and they remain allegations in the reporting cited here.
The Digital Machine
The online operation changed shape after the first round. Instead of relying only on Lula’s official channels, it pushed the message through lawmakers and celebrities with audiences of their own, Diário Carioca reported.
Lula’s Army on WhatsApp
The best-documented tool was a WhatsApp channel called Exército do Lula, or Lula’s Army. Al Jazeera reported that congressman André Janones ran it. It had about 60,000 followers after the first round and nearly 11 million by election day. That is roughly 183 times its starting size (11,000,000 divided by 60,000).
The mechanics were simple. Janones posted a video asking supporters to enlist as “soldiers” by sending salute emojis. Followers then received “missions,” such as recruiting friends or sharing videos and hashtags. They could not reply in the channel. They could forward and react, often in the tens of thousands. Researcher Viktor Chagas called this “electoral gamification,” because Janones set collective targets for supporters to hit together.
The channel briefly went dark. A minister of the electoral court ordered it suspended on October 11, and the order was revoked about four hours later, Agência Pública reported.
The evidence on impact is mixed. Pagliarini, an expert quoted by Al Jazeera, said there is no clear empirical link between the channel and the result. Chagas said it is “difficult to imagine” the outcome without it. He also noted occasional negative campaigning and “content of questionable origin” in the channel.
The Selfie Reboot
In August, President Lula did not want to shoot selfie videos. CNN Brasil reported that the vertical format left him uncomfortable and that he wanted “votes,” not “likes.” He also asked his team to tone down memes he did not consider serious.
By October, he was pressing record. O Povo reported that Lula began recording selfie-style videos after the first round. Agência Pública counted about 20 of them, mostly on labor rights and rallies. The first, posted to Instagram on October 8, opened with “Bora, gente, vamos conversar com as pessoas.” Roughly: come on, folks, let’s go talk to people.
The team behind the camera changed too. O Povo said Raul Rabelo remained the campaign’s official marketer, while Rafael Marroquim and Bruno Monteiro joined from the campaigns of João Campos and Jerônimo Rodrigues. The brief was “priority for digital communication” and “a more incisive approach” against Flávio.
The tone shifted with the format. According to the BBC, the campaign moved from defending the government’s record to warning about the risks of a Flávio victory. A senior Workers’ Party figure summed it up for Agência Pública as “CPF contra CPF,” a reference to Brazil’s personal tax ID. Person against person.
Borrowed Audiences
Influencers and artists gave the campaign reach it did not have to build. Agência Pública reported that progressive influencers and young members of Congress were called to Brasília to work across Instagram, YouTube, TikTok and WhatsApp. More than 200 artists posted videos or declared support. Their combined audience topped 400 million followers.
That 400 million figure needs care. It adds up follower counts across accounts, so the same person can be counted many times. It measures potential reach, not unique viewers.
Young lawmakers acted as extra distribution points. Diário Carioca reported on an October 7 meeting in Brasília, after which Lula recorded a video with them aimed at young voters. Its message was specific. “Let’s bring the boys and girls from Pé-de-Meia to vote,” he said, naming a federal savings program for high school students. One deputy, Ana Elisa, told Agência Pública that about 90% of her own votes came from her digital presence.
The Podcast Tour
The podcast push started before the first round. Brasil 247 reported, citing a Metrópoles column, that the campaign would prioritize podcast and videocast interviews. The Workers’ Party communications secretary, Éden Valadares, explained the logic. Many members of Generation Z “only know Lula as president.”
The shows named included Inteligência Ltda., Meteoro Brasil, Não Inviabilize and As Cunhãs. Three days before the first round, Lula sat for the Flow Podcast live on YouTube, Congresso em Foco reported. The stated aim, per Brasil 247, was a lighter and more intimate Lula than a formal interview allows.
Platform Rules and the AI Question
Two decisions in this area were about risk as much as reach. One limited what the campaign would publish. The other challenged what a platform would show.
Real Footage Only
The campaign set an early rule on artificial intelligence. CNN Brasil reported in July that AI would be used only to edit and improve content, never to place Lula in fictional videos or images. The stated reason was legal. It would “reduce the risk of challenges” before the electoral courts.
The rule became a contrast tool. When Flávio Bolsonaro posted an AI video of himself flying a fighter jet, Lula’s allies said they would not answer in kind, according to CNN Brasil. They would instead highlight the difference between real footage and fully artificial content. A later CNN Brasil report added that Lula personally rejected AI in the campaign.
The courts were watching this area closely. On October 13, the Superior Electoral Court ordered the Liberal Party to remove an AI-made Instagram video that linked Lula to organized crime. The court’s own notice does not say who filed the complaint.
Taking Meta to the Electoral Court
The second decision targeted a platform. Lula’s campaign complained that Meta’s AI tool would not generate images of Lula but would generate images of Flávio. On October 15, Agência Brasil reported, Minister Marco Aurélio Bellizze barred Meta from limiting the reach or search visibility of posts about either candidate. Noncompliance would cost R$500,000 per day.
The ruling did not find bad faith. Bellizze wrote that there was no evidence the failure came from “a deliberate criterion.” Meta said it had temporarily stopped recommending candidates or generating images of them.
For marketers, the lesson is narrow but real. When distribution runs through a handful of platforms, how those platforms treat your content becomes part of the campaign, and a legal channel can be one way to contest it. TIME’s opinion section listed this fight among the campaign’s moves.
Message Design
Much of the messaging was built well before the runoff. Some of it was more than a year old on election day.
One Villain, Repeated for Fifteen Months
In July 2025, the Workers’ Party gathered about 270 content creators for a social media push called “taxação BBB,” IstoÉ Dinheiro reported, republishing Estadão. BBB stood for bancos, bets e bilionários: banks, betting companies and billionaires. Party communications secretary Jilmar Tatto summed up the line as “making the top pay taxes.” Weekly videos followed. Marketing experts quoted in the same piece doubted the effect on voters.
The frame did not go away. On October 10, 2026, Brasil 247 reported, citing a UOL column, that the campaign planned to tie Flávio and his new centrão allies to the “BBB caucus” and to “the system.” That is fifteen months from first push to runoff use (July 2025 to October 2026).
The government’s communications office had already reworked the framing. CNN Brasil reported in December 2025 that Secom chief Sidônio Palmeira was credited with moving it from rich versus poor to “poor versus privileged.” One enemy, many formats.
A Cap as a Logo
The sovereignty message got a physical object early. In February 2025, Lula posted a video wearing a blue cap printed with “O Brasil é dos brasileiros,” or “Brazil belongs to Brazilians,” CNN Brasil reported. Ministers and allied lawmakers wore it the same week, including at the opening session of Congress. The opposition answered with green-and-yellow caps of its own.
The idea was attributed to Palmeira by an opposition leader, Liberal Party floor leader Sóstenes Cavalcante. “Each of his ideas, we’ll copy and do better,” Cavalcante said, in CNN Brasil’s report.
Timing matters here. Lula formally launched his reelection bid on August 2, 2026, per Wikipedia. The cap came about 18 months earlier. By the runoff, defending Brazil’s sovereignty against foreign interference was a central theme, with Lula pointing to US tariffs, Al Jazeera reported. The symbol was already familiar.
TV Ads That Point at the Viewer
Brazil gives candidates free radio and TV time based largely on the size of their coalitions in Congress. CartaCapital estimated that Lula’s first-round share was 5 minutes 32 seconds per block, against 4 minutes 20 seconds for Flávio. In seconds, that is 332 against 260. The 72-second gap gave Lula about 28% more time (72 divided by 260). CartaCapital linked it to the size of his alliance, which it counted at 127 federal deputies against 98 for the Liberal Party.
The runoff ads used that time to make the opponent’s plans personal. Gazeta do Povo reported that Lula’s October 22 TV slot opened with a narrator saying Flávio would “crush” Brazil with a proposed R$250 billion budget cut. Then Lula’s line: “When he talks about cuts, you are the expense he wants to cut.” The ad named pensions, programs protecting women, the new extra rest day and Bolsa Família as possible targets.
Those claims were the campaign’s description of an opponent’s plan, not an independent costing. As copywriting, it followed a familiar rule. It moved a budget abstraction onto the viewer’s own household.
Jingles With Different Jobs
The campaign used songs for distinct purposes. In July, it released a remake of the 1990s funk hit “Rap do Silva” by MC Bob Rum, O Tempo reported. It presented Lula da Silva as “one more Silva,” a man of the people, tracing his path from a poor childhood in the Northeast to the presidency. The video mixed in images of his meetings with foreign leaders, including Donald Trump.
The October jingle had a different job. Attack. Poder360 reported that “Flávio, abre o sigilo,” meaning “Flávio, open your records,” was sung from a sound truck at an October 20 event in Juazeiro and Petrolina. It demanded that Flávio release his financial and phone records.
The song came with a matching move. The same day, the campaign asked the electoral court to open the records of Lula and his relatives, on the condition that Flávio did the same. Lula had first issued the challenge at the Band debate on October 18, according to Poder360. Biography in July. Contrast in October.
Managing the Big Moments
Campaigns cannot script everything. They can choose which stages to stand on, and they can prepare for the moment an opponent slips.
Choosing Which Debates to Attend
Lula skipped the crowded first-round debates. CNN Brasil reported that allies judged he had “more to lose than to gain” from live exposure at that stage. They also argued the format “favors trading accusations and producing clips for social media.” The campaign spent the time on state trips instead, especially in the Southeast.
Lula defended the choice in public. On the Flow Podcast he called the multi-candidate debates “fruitless,” Congresso em Foco reported. Nexo noted that the refusal repeated a tactic other candidates had used in earlier elections.
The runoff was different. One opponent. One stage. Lula faced Flávio directly in the Band debate on October 18, Poder360 reported, and again in the TV Globo debate on October 23.
Turning an Insult Into a Hashtag
The Globo debate produced a moment that spread fast online. Discussing wages, Flávio said Lula “gives with one hand and takes away with the 9 fingers,” Poder360 reported. Lula lost a finger in a workplace accident as a young metalworker.
His reply turned the line back on its author. “If anyone lost a finger at 17, it was me,” Lula said, adding that Flávio had “never worked a day in his life.” He demanded an apology and got one. His answer also carried an insult of its own. Jovem Pan quoted him saying he would not let “a militia member” call him nine fingers.
The online network moved the same night. Janones led a push for #SomosTodos9Dedos, “we are all nine fingers,” which reached fifth place among the most discussed topics on X, according to Poder360. Supporters posted photos of their own amputated fingers in solidarity, Al Jazeera reported.
This is where the WhatsApp channel and the debate strategy met. A live television moment became a participation campaign in one evening. Speed came from infrastructure built earlier.
Widening the Audience
Two efforts aimed beyond the Workers’ Party’s usual base. One used the vocabulary of faith. The other used local faces.
Speaking to Evangelical Voters
The campaign wrote to evangelical voters in their own language. America Magazine reported that it distributed a pamphlet titled “The Brazil that Cares for Families: Faith, Hope, Social Justice and Freedom.” It tied policy proposals to Bible passages, describing life as a “gift from God” with a citation to John 10:10. The magazine called it “an unusual move.”
The messengers mattered as much as the words. First Lady Rosângela “Janja” Lula da Silva performed a campaign song with gospel singer Kleber Lucas, the same report said, even though the couple is not evangelical. At the first runoff rally, pastor and federal deputy Otoni de Paula was given the job of courting evangelicals, Agência Pública reported. Pastor Henrique Vieira was among the lawmakers at the October 7 meeting with Lula, according to Diário Carioca.
None of the reporting cited here measures how evangelical voters actually moved. The tactic is documented. Its effect is not.
Local Messengers in Every State
No Brazil leader can be everywhere at once. Brazil has 26 states and a federal district, so the campaign recruited local faces.
The runoff coordination grew. O Povo reported that Camilo Santana, Rui Costa and Rafael Fonteles officially joined the campaign’s leadership after the first round. Lawmakers and newly elected governors appeared in campaign social media and at rallies in several state capitals, Gazeta do Povo reported.
Across Brazil, Lula’s allies also ran their own events. Agência Pública described one at the Federal University of Amapá, led by deputy Guilherme Cortez and Senator Randolfe Rodrigues. The model is familiar to any brand with regional distributors. The national message stays fixed. The messenger changes by region.
The Opponent’s Mistakes Count Too
Part of the swing may have come from the other side. Denilde Holzhacker told BBC News Brasil that Flávio’s first mistake was “leaving the first round with the feeling that he had already won.” She said he also struggled to explain his economic proposals and had a poor first runoff debate. De Queiroz’s opinion column argues that Flávio’s debate conduct, including the finger remark, raised doubts about his fitness for office.
Policy and Marketing Are Hard to Separate
The runoff also brought government decisions that a marketing lens cannot isolate. Gazeta do Povo reported that tax-debt forgiveness for about 3.6 million microentrepreneurs was announced 12 days before the vote, and that the end of the six-day work week was promulgated on October 16. Its headline called them electioneering announcements. A Gazeta do Povo opinion column went further, listing ten late moves it described as opportunistic.
Supporters framed the same measures differently. Lula called the work-week change “an historic achievement for millions of workers,” Common Dreams reported. Either way, voters reacting to a policy and voters reacting to an ad look identical in a vote count.
Some Numbers Are Softer Than They Look
Some figures here deserve caution. The WhatsApp channel’s growth is well documented, but its effect is disputed, as noted above. The 400 million follower total for supporting artists double counts anyone who follows more than one of them.
Paid social media spending is murkier still. Perfil Brasil, citing g1, reported that Lula’s campaign put R$2.59 million into social networks against R$7.45 million for Flávio. ND Mais reported almost R$12 million in Meta ads across two Lula pages, over different dates and with internally inconsistent totals. The two reports measure different things. This article does not treat ad spending as a proven tactic for that reason.
A Narrow Mandate
The final margin was 3.58 percentage points (51.79 minus 48.21). On the eve of the vote, a Quaest poll cited by the BBC put rejection of Flávio at 49% and of Lula at 47%. For a sitting Brazilian president, that is a slim cushion.
One TIME opinion writer put it bluntly. “He has won four years. He has not won back the country.”
Negative campaigning also ran in both directions. The Superior Electoral Court ordered the Liberal Party to remove an AI video attacking Lula, as described above. Lula, in turn, called his opponent “a militia member” on live television. A marketing analysis can describe those choices. It cannot clean them up.
Marketing Lessons From the Campaign
Strip out the politics and the Lula Brazil case reads like a product relaunch under deadline pressure. The lessons below describe what the campaign did. They do not judge whether its policies were right.
Pick the Audience Before the Message
The first decision was who to talk to. With 33.5 million first-round abstainers and a 2.2 million vote gap, the campaign’s biggest bet was on people who already leaned its way but had not shown up. President Lula’s appeal to voters over 70 is the clearest example. Persuading an opponent is expensive. Reminding a supporter is cheap.
Build Distribution Before You Need It
The #SomosTodos9Dedos moment took one evening because the network already existed. Janones’s channel and the artists’ accounts already had audiences before the debate. A brand that waits for its viral moment to build a channel usually misses the moment.
Let the Format Win the Argument
In August, the candidate resisted selfie videos. In October, after finishing second in the first round, he recorded about 20 of them. The same logic sat behind the podcast tour, aimed at young voters who had only known Lula as president. When the platform rewards a format, the principal’s comfort becomes a secondary concern.
Repeat One Frame Across Every Asset
The “banks, bets and billionaires” line ran for fifteen months. The sovereignty cap appeared about 18 months before the formal launch. The runoff TV ads then brought the same contrast down to the level of a single household. Repetition is unglamorous. It is also how a frame becomes familiar.
Treat Compliance as Part of the Plan
The AI rule was designed to keep the campaign’s own content out of court. The Meta complaint and the election-day filing used the courts to protect reach and turnout. In a regulated channel, legal work is not separate from marketing. It is distribution by other means.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who Is the Current Brazilian President?
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. He has been in office since January 1, 2023, according to Wikipedia, and won the October 25, 2026 runoff with 51.79% of valid votes, BBC News Brasil reported.
How Old Is Lula?
Lula is 81. Wikipedia gives his birth date as October 27, 1945, so he turned 81 two days after the 2026 runoff. The same page notes that his registered birth date is October 6, 1945.
Who Did Lula Defeat in 2026?
Senator Flávio Bolsonaro of the Liberal Party, son of Jair Bolsonaro. Flávio led the first round with about 47% to Lula’s 44.9%, Al Jazeera reported, before losing the runoff.
Has Lula Been President of Brazil Before?
Yes. He first served from 2003 to 2010, then returned in 2023 after defeating Jair Bolsonaro, per Wikipedia. The 2026 win makes him Brazil president for a fourth term, which TIME called historic.
Which Marketing Tactic Mattered Most?
No one can say for certain. BBC News Brasil’s analysis put falling abstention first among four factors. Columnist Antônio Augusto de Queiroz called the reversal of abstention the main mechanism in his analysis. Those are informed readings, not measured effects.
“It was an Unbelievable Comeback Made Possible by Lula’s Unique Marketing Campaign”- Dewan Ysul Zulkarnain
Three weeks to go, and 2.2 million votes behind. Back in August, the candidate had not even wanted to film selfie videos.
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva closed that gap with a campaign that put more effort into getting its own supporters to vote than into converting opponents. The record shows a turnout drive aimed at abstainers and older voters, carried by a WhatsApp channel that grew to nearly 11 million followers. It also shows a message frame that Lula da Silva’s allies had been repeating for more than a year.
The record does not show that any single choice decided the race. The margin was 3.58 points, and the opponent’s mistakes and mid-campaign policy changes muddy any one explanation.
What it does show is how a campaign behaves when the first-round numbers come back wrong. It changes formats fast. It goes looking for the voters who stayed home. That is the part marketers can study, whatever they think of the president of Brazil who benefited from it.